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ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNMENT POLICY 
by Murray L. Weidenbaum 
This article examines the relationship between government policy and 
energy needs, with special attention to the taxation and regulation of 
gasoline. It concludes with a series of proposals for reducing or eliminating 
the special treatment -- both supportive and punitive --that now 
characterizes public policy in the United States toward the energy sector of 
American industry. 
The U.S. petroleum industry's stock of plant and equipment far exceeds 
that of any other sector of American industry. But the industry's mass of 
capital is not merely a reflection of its large size. As the nation's major 
energy sector, it is extremely capital intensive. As shown in Table 1, oil 
companies use far more capital per worker than any other industry. 
In 1981, the petroleum refining industry reported $314,801 in assets per 
employee, and mining and crude-oil producers reported $383,787. In striking 
contrast, the chemical industry reported $94,299, and the all-industry average 
was a modest $60,437 in assets per worker. But these figures are not a matter 
of the energy industry resting on its economic laurels. 
The U.S. Department of Energy has estimated that the domestic oil and gas 
industry will need to invest an average of $25-30 billion annually during 
the 1980s for exploratory development, production, and refining capacity to 
achieve modest energy goals. Other private estimates range as high as $35 
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TABLE 1 
Capital Intensity, For Selected Industries, 1981 
Industry 
Mining and Crude-oil Production 
Petroleum Refining 
Beverages 
Chemicals 
Paper, Fiber and Wood Products 
Metal Manufacturing 
Tobacco 
Pharmaceuticals 
Publishing and Printing 
Soaps and Cosmetics 
Average For All Industries 
Assets Per Employee 
$383,787 
314,801 
95,828 
94,299 
92,023 
82,380 
78,730 
74,388 
57,924 
57,175 
$ 60,437 
Source: Computed from data in Fortune, May 3, 1982. 
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billion a year.1 The magnitude of that financial task can be better 
appreciated when we consider that comparable expenditures were less than $13 
billion in 1972 and approximately $20 billion in 1978. The Energy Department 
also estimates that the domestic coal industry will have to invest between $5 
and $6 billion annually during the 1980s to achieve modest energy goals. This 
compares to actual investments of less than $1 billion in 1972 and $2.4 
billion in 1978. 
Review of Government Policy and the Energy Industry 
Any balanced review of the development of the federal government's tax 
and regulatory policy toward the energy industry would conclude that it has 
had a checkered past.2 
The first major development in energy policy in the United States was the 
establishment in 1926 of the system of depletion allowances for oil and gas. 
In that year, Congress amended the recently enacted Internal Revenue Code to 
set percentage depletion allowance rules, permitting oil and gas producers and 
royalty owners to receive, tax-free, 27.5 percent of the wellhead value of oil 
and gas production (up to 50 percent of the net income from each property). 
These rules stayed in effect until the Tax Reform Act of 1969. A related tax 
provision permits the immediate write-off of intangible drilling costs which 
occur in oil and gas exploration and development, such as the wages of 
drilling crews. 
1Economic Report of the President, January 1980, Washington, D.C., U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1980, p. 115. 
2walter J. Mead, "The Use of Taxes, Regulation, and Price Controls in the 
Energy Sector, .. National Tax Journal, September 1978, pp. 229-235; and Murray 
L. Weidenbaum, Business, Government, and the Public, second edition, Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1981, pp. 114-128. 
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Over the years these two tax incentives -- depletion allowances and 
expensing of intangible drilling costs --had a strong effect on the energy 
industry. They led to high levels of domestic investment, large new oil 
discoveries, a low average price of energy, and a resultant high consumption 
pattern of energy in the United States. But the tax incentives did not 
operate independently. These conditions resulted in the passage of important 
regulatory legislation in the 1930s. The Interstate Oil Compact Commission 
Act authorized states to limit (or 11 prorate 11 ) all oil production within their 
borders in order to avoid 11Wasteful 11 levels of production and market 11 gluts. 11 
The Connally Hot Oil Act was the enforcement mechanism; it denied producers 
the right to sell their product in interstate commerce in violation of state 
prorationing laws. 
From 1960 through 1965, for example, prorating by the Texas Railroad 
Commission limited production to 27-29 percent of the basic maximum allowable 
rate of production by well. The operation of the prorationing system served, 
in effect, to offset much of the impact that the tax incentives had on 
petroleum prices and output. 
To make matters worse, market-demand prorationing supported domestic oil 
prices at levels that substantially exceeded the price of imported oil. This 
relationship, of course, encouraged the growth of petroleum imports into the 
United States. With rising imports, the market supply restrictions imposed by 
the prorationing system became increasingly difficult for domestic producers 
to bear. In 1959, President Eisenhower, by executive proclamation, imposed 
mandatory quotas on oil imports. The import quotas led to more rapid 
exploitation of domestic oil reserves than would have occurred otherwise. 
Previously, in 1954, the Federal Power Commission (now the Federal Energy 
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Regulatory Commission) had set wellhead prices for natural gas flowing into 
interstate commerce at levels substantially below world market prices. The 
FPC action thus encouraged more domestic consumption of energy. 
Thus, during the years of rapid economic growth that characterized much 
of the period following World War II, the United States had available energy 
below world market prices. As a result of government policy, therefore, this 
nation on balance consumed far more oil and natural gas than would have been 
the case under a free market situation. 
The regulatory atmosphere began to change dramatically in the 1970s. In 
August 1971, President Nixon imposed price controls on the economy generally 
(exempting special sectors such as agriculture). In 1973-74 the controls were 
lifted on everything except crude oil and petroleum prices. 
The combination of tax subsidies and import quotas stimulated domestic 
oil production for decades. This encouraged the rapid utilization of domestic 
energy and the growing dependence on foreign sources. The economic impacts of 
the import restrictions became increasingly difficult to live with, and 
President Nixon eliminated them effective May 1, 1973. 3 
But the growing dependence of the United States on foreign energy in 
recent years has been accompanied, oddly enough, by a shift in tax policy away 
from encouragement of domestic energy development and production. The 1969 
Tax Reform Act reduced depletion allowances to 22 percent. Subsequently, the 
Tax Reduction Act of 1975 eliminated percentage depletion almost entirely for 
major integrated producers of oil anrl gas. That Act also provided for phased 
reductions of tax depletion benefits for smaller producers, which are defined 
3Mead, ~cit., p. 231. 
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as producers that neither refine more than 50,000 barrels of oil a day nor 
have a retail outlet. Beginning in 1984, the applicable rate of percentage 
depletion for those producers which are covered will be reduced from 22 
percent to 15 percent, and the maximum amount of oil which is granted tax 
exemption will be cut to 1,000 barrels a day; the maximum allowable exemption 
for gas will be reduced to 6 million cubic feet of gas a day. In 1976 and 
1977, Congress enacted technical amendments to the Internal Revenue Code 
which limited the tax advantages of intangible drilling costs.4 
Meanwhile, beginning in late 1973 and extending through part of 1974, the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) embargoed the shipment of 
oil to many nations, including the United States, and when it lifted the 
embargo, it quadrupled world oil prices. This situation led to the 
establishment of a Federal Energy Administration, as well as a series of 
actions by the federal government to increase domestic energy supply and 
reduce demand. However, those efforts were restricted by pressures both to 
limit price increases to American consumers and to contain 11Windfall 11 profits 
on the part of American oil producers. 
In December 1975 President Ford signed the Energy Policy and Conservation 
Act. The law provided for price controls on crude oil ranging from a low of 
$5.25 a barrel on 11 0ld 11 oil (oil from fields in operation in 1973) to $11.28 a 
barrel for 11 new 11 oil. At the time, the world price of oil delivered to the 
United States was $13.50 a barrel. Under this act refiners were required to 
make cost-equalizing payments to one another --so-called .. entitlements ... 
These resulted in each refiner paying the same average price for a barrel of 
oil, regardless of whether it was classified as 11 0ld 11 or new, .. or whether it 
4The Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1981, Special Analyses, Washington, 
D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980, p. 218. 
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was produced domestically or imported. The average price established by the 
combination of price controls and entitlements was below the imported price. 
Each company importing foreign oil in effect received a subsidy from American 
producers to cover the difference between the higher world price and the lower 
and controlled price. In May 1979 that subsidy came to $2.56 a barrel. 
In the fall of 1977 Congress established a permanent Department of 
Energy, thus making it clear that federal intervention in this area of economy 
was not a transient matter, limited only to short-term factors such as the 
OPEC embargo. 
In November 1978 Congress passed a substantially modified version of 
President Carter•s energy plan. The new law gave the President authority to 
phase out price controls on oil over an extended period of time. Under this 
approach, a growing proportion of oil from 11 old 11 wells could be solo at 11 new 11 
prices. Thus, by December 1979 an 11 old 11 well producing 100 barrels of oil a 
day could sell 12 barrels at 11 new 11 prices; by December 1980 it could sell 54 
barrels at the higher price. In January 1981, President Reagan used the 
authority of the 1978 law to eliminate price and allocation controls over 
gasoline and petroleum products. 
The 1978 law was more ambivalent on natural gas, extending price controls 
to cover previously exempt intrastate gas. In general, the 1978 act contained 
price escalation provisions which permitted increases only at the general rate 
of inflation. Three exceptions were provided: (a) new gas, (b) high-cost gas 
produced from depths of 15,000 feet or greater, and (c) small wells (so-called 
stripper well production). These latter categories were allowed additional 
price increases of 3 1/2 to 4 percent a year. 
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The 1978 law provided partial decontrol of natural gas in the following 
manner: In November 1979 the price of new, high-cost gas was decontrolled. 
Moreover, on January 1, 1985, three more categories are to be decontrolled, 
including gas produced from wells drilled after February 19, 1977, and at 
least two-and-a-half miles from the nearest existing well or at least 1,000 
feet below the deepest well within two-and-a-half miles. On July 1, 1987, 
decontrol is provided for new wells from depths of 5,000 feet or less. The 
prices for all other categories of natural gas will continue to be controlled 
permanently. Table 2 shows the complexity of federal regulation of natural 
gas pricing. 
The Energy Tax Act of 1978, on the other hand, did create a variety of 
specialized tax incentives -- but limited them to non-petroleum energy 
sources. For example, after September 30, 1978, production from geothermal 
deposits became eligible for percentage depletion at the same rate as that for 
oil and gas, but with no limit on output and no restriction with respect to 
the size of qualifying producers. In lieu of percentage depletion, royalties 
from coal deposits are treated as capital gains rather than ordinary income. 
The 1978 Act also provides a 15 percent income tax credit to individuals 
\ 
for home insulation and other energy conserving components, up to a maximum 
credit of $300. A credit of 30 percent on the first $2,000 of expenditures 
and 20 percent on the next $8,000 is allowed for solar and other renewable 
energy source property. For business, the Act sets an additional 10 percent 
credit on such specified energy property as recycling equipment, shale oil 
equipment, equipment for producing natural gas from geopressurized brine, and 
so forth.5 
9 
TABLE 2 
Complications in Decontrolling the Price of Natural Gas 
Type of Production 
Stripper well 
New outer continental shelf leases 
(after 4/20/77) 
Ne~ onshore wells 
New onshore reserviors 
Gas from reservoirs discovered after 
7/26/76 on pre-4/20/77 shelf leases 
Production from below 15,000 feet 
from wells drilled after 2/19/77 
Onshore - below 5,000 feet 
Onshore - above 5,000 feet 
Interstate commerce gas - before 
enactment - wells started 
1/1/75-2/18/77 
Prodhoe Bay - Alaska gas or gas not 
otherwise covered 
Interstate commerce gas - before 
enactment - wells started 
1/1/73-12/31/74 
Small Producer 
Large Producer 
Sales under "rollover" contracts -
intrastate 
Replacement contract or 
recompletion - small producer 
Interstate rollover contracts -
small producer 
Interstate rollover contracts -
1 arge producer 
Replacement contract or recompletion 
Certain Permian Basin gas - small 
producer 
Certain Rocky Mountain gas -
small producer 
Certain Permian Basin gas -
1 arge producer 
Certain Rocky Mountain gas -
large producer 
Certain Appalachian Basin gas -
north sub area - contract after 
10/7/69 
Other contracts 
Minimum rate gas - all producers 
Sold unter existing intrastate 
contract 
Price 
as of Jan. 1979 
(per million BTUs) 
$2.24 
2.10 
2.10 
2.10 
2.10 
2.10 
1.98 
1.98 
1.64 
1.64 
1.39 
1.06 
1.00 or more 
.78 
.72 
.61 
.60 
.47 
.47 
.41 
.40 
.37 
.35 
.20 
Contract Price 
Source: Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 
Date of Deregulation 
Not deregulated 
1/1/85. 
1/1/85 
1/1/85 
Not deregulated 
Deregulated on effective 
date of FERC incre-
mental pricing rule 
1/1/85 
1/1/87 
Not deregulated 
Not deregulated 
Not deregulated 
Not deregu 1 at ed 
1/1/85 if > $1.00 
Not deregulated 
Not deregulated 
Not deregulated 
Not deregulated 
Not deregulated 
Not deregulated 
Not deregulated 
Not deregulated 
Not deregulated 
Not deregulated 
Not deregulated 
1/1/85 if > $1.00; not 
deregulated if lower 
than $1.00 
10 
In 1980, the Congress enacted a 11Windfall profits 11 tax to siphon off to 
the Treasury a large part of the increased revenue resulting from both the 
rising world oil prices and the phased decontrol of domestic oil prices. 
Price and allocation controls were eliminated in January 1981, and the 
windfall profits tax is scheduled to expire in 1990 (unless the revenue 
objectives are achieved sooner). The tax is a specified percentage of the 
difference between the sales price in the field and the base price for each 
category of oil, adjusted for inflation after June 1979, using the GNP 
deflator with a six-month data lag. For example, oil from Prudhoe Bay is 
taxed at a 70 percent rate on revenue above a $12.80 a barrel (adjusted for 
inflation), while stripper oil is taxed at a 60 percent rate on revenue above 
$15.20 a barrel (adjusted for inflation) and new, tertiary, and heavy oil is 
taxed at a 30 percent rate on revenue above $16.55 a barrel (adjusted for 
inflation plus two percent). State severance taxes of up to 15 percent are 
deductible. The tax is limited to 90 percent of net income from the 
property. 
The windfall profits tax is scheduled to be phased out over a 33-month 
period at a rate of three percent a month, beginning in January 1988 or the 
month after cumulative tax revenues have reached $227 billion, whichever is 
later. If the $227 billion figure is not attained, the phaseout would start 
no later than January 1991. 
Although we cannot estimate precisely the negative effects on domestic 
oil production of the new excise tax levied under the guise of 11Windfall 
profits taxation, .. the direction of the impact is clear: the less revenue to 
-a producer from a barrel of oil, the lower the resultant supply will be. 
Surely, a lower domestic supply of oil will be economically feasible at a net 
5Ibid, p. 219. 
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revenue of $20 per barrel (after payment of the tax) than would have been 
forthcoming at, say, $30 per barrel, without the tax. We do not know the 
precise 11elasticity 11 or responsiveness of supply to price, but clearly the 
relationship is positive. The higher the price, the greater the supply 
forthcoming, and vice versa. 
Clearly, this special tax -- levied in addition to the regular taxes paid 
by petroleum and other companies -- also reduces the amount of funds that the 
industry has available for investment in domestic equipment, development, 
production, and refining. For example, Exxon estimates its 11Windfall profits 11 
tax in 1980 at $800 million. This sum is the equivalent of drilling 800 
wells at an average cost of $1 million each or investing over 3,000 
crew-months of seismic exploration. 6 Simultaneously, of course, the windfall 
profits tax increases the ability of the government to take a more active role 
in financing energy activities. 
This tax is, moreover, an extremely complex piece of legislation when 
viewed in terms of the costly administrative burdens that it imposes on the 
private sector. For example, hundreds of thousands of informational documents 
have to be exchanged between royalty owners, producers, operators, and 
purchasers.? Table 3, containing an approximation of the computation of the 
tax on selected categories of oil, may provide the reader with some indication 
of the intricacies involved in complying with the windfall profits tax. 
The law instituting the windfall profits tax also provides for a $3 per 
barrel tax credit for producers of designated alternative energy sources: 
6McCarter Middlebrook, Testimony for the American Petroleum Institute 
et al. to the Internal Revenue Service Re: Costs, Etc., of Collecting 
Windfall Profits Tax, July 25, 1980, p. 2. 
?Issues in Review, Exxon Company, USA, June 1Y80, p. 2. 
TABLE 3 
Computation of Windfall Profit Tax on 
Selected Crude Oil Categories for March 198o(1) 
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 
40° South 40° West Texas 
louisiana Sour 
27° ANS Upper Market Upper Market 
(Sadlerochit) Tier Tier Tier .lli!._ So. La. W. Tex. S. So. LA. W. Tex. S. 
Posted price (3/12/80 
posting ANS estimated 
average net back)~ 15.45 14.18 38.00 13.93 36.00 38.00 36.00 38.00 36.00 
Base price -- tier 1-5/79 
U.T. ceiling minus $.21 12.70 13.03 13.03 12.78 12.78 
Tier 2 - 15.20 x highest 
35.00 
1/14/80 posting for 12/79 16.07 15.20 
Tier 3 - 16.55 x highest 
35.00 
1/14/80 posting for 12/79 17.50 16.55 
Inflation adjustment ( ) 
Tiers 1 & 2 - .01(5~72 2 
Tier 3 - .0246348 3 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 • 31 .30 .43 .41 
Adjusted base price 12.95 13.28 13.28 13.03 13.03 16.38 15.50 17.93 16.96 
TAPS adjustment .08 
t-> 
Severance tax adj~s~ment on N 
price increment 4 .29 .11 3.09 .04 1.06 2.70 .94 2.51 .88 
"Windfall profit" 2.13 .79 21.63 .86 2i.91 18.92 19.56 17.56 18.16 
Windfall profit tax 1.49 .55 15.14 .60 15.34 11.35 11.74 5.27 5.45 
Wellhead realization net of 
WPT and severance tax 12.18 11.86 18.11 12.69 19.00 21.90 22.60 27.98 28.89 
(1) Ignoring net income limitation 
(2) *GBO 79-111, 166.99 minus GNP 79-11, 163.79) : 163.79 
(.3) (GNP 79-111, 166.99 times 1.005 minus GNP 79-11, 163.79) : 163.79 
(4) Using 11.5% effective rate for ANS, 12.5 for So. La., 4.6% for W. Tex. Sour. 
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(1) oil from shale and tar sands, 
(2) natural gas from tight sands, geopressured brine, coal seams 
or Devonian shale, 
(3) synthetic fuels (other than alcohol) from coal, and 
(4) certain energy from biomass, wood, and agricultural products. 
This credit will be phased out as the average wellhead price for uncontrolled 
domestic oil rises from $23.50 a barrel to $29.50 a barrel (measured in 1979 
dollars). Other tax credit provisions include extension of gasohol •s 
exemption from the four cents a gallon federal excise tax from 1984 to 1992, 
and additional tax crerlits for business investment in solar, wind, and 
geothermal equipment, in cogeneration equipment, and for residential solar, 
wind and geothermal investments. 
The residential tax credit under the act has been increased to 40 percent 
on qualifying expenditures up to $10,000 a year for a maximum credit of 
$4,000. The business tax credit has been increased from 10 percent to 15 
percent. The termination date has been postponed from December 31, 1982, to 
December 31, 1985, and cogeneration equipment has been added to the list of 
property eligible for the credit. 
To recapitulate, the full list of alternative energy property qualifying 
for the energy tax credit follows: 
A. Alternative energy property which includes: 
(1) boilers or other burners, the primary fuel of which is 
fuel other than oil, gas, or products from oil and gas 
(i.e., alternative substances); 
(2) equipment used to convert alternate substances into 
synthetic liquid, gaseous or solid fuel (other than coke 
or coke gas); 
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(3) equipment used to convert or modify existing oil and gas 
burners to use alternate substances as fuel (or a fuel 
mixture with content of at least 25 percent alternate 
substances); 
(4) equipment which uses coal (including lignite) as a 
feedstock for the manufacture of chemicals or other 
products (other than coke or coke gas); 
(5) pollution control equipment required by federal, state, 
or local regulations to be installed in connection with 
such alternate energy property; 
(6) equipment used generally in the storage, transfer or 
preparation of alternate substance for use in alternate 
energy property; 
(7) equipment used to produce, distribute or use energy 
derived from a geothermal deposit (up to but not 
including the electrical transmission stage for 
electricity produced by geothermal power). 
B. Solar or wind energy property. 
C. Specially defined energy property, including recuperators, 
heat wheels, regenerators, heat exchangers, waste heat 
boilers, heat pipes, automatic energy control systems, 
preheaters, combustible gas recovery systems, or any other 
kinds of property which are specified in Treasury 
regulations, the primary purpose of which is to reduce the 
amount of energy consumption in existing industrial or 
commerical facilities. 
15 
D. Solid waste recycling equipment. 
E. Property used to mine and extract oi 1 from sha 1 e (through · 
retorting). 
F. Equipment for producing natural gas from geopressured brine. 
It is intriguing to note that the Congressional deliberations on the 
windfall profits tax also served, in effect, to set aside consideration of 
proposed changes in the foreign tax credit which would have a serious effect 
on the petroleum industry's overseas activities. In April 1979, President 
Carter announced that he would propose legislation to limit the foreign tax 
credit allowed for income taxes paid on foreign oil and gas extraction income. 
In June 1979, the Treasury sent to Congress its legislative proposal to limit 
such credits to the lesser of: 
(1) the tax credit computed with respect to overall foreign 
oil and gas extraction income (net of losses), or 
(2) the tax credit computed with respect to such income on a 
country-by-country basis. 
In effect, the administration's plan would have reduced the total credits 
from all foreign oil and gas extraction operations by offsetting net income in 
some countries with net losses in others. This would have eliminated some 
foreign tax credits for foreign income taxes actually paid by oil companies 
and, thus, it would have subjected the firms to double taxation. In early 
1980, however, the Secretary of Treasury William Miller advised the Senate 
Finance Committee that he would propose a revised set of foreign tax credit 
changes. The Treasury Department subsequently indicated it would not put 
forth any new suggestions in this area until after the windfall profits tax 
was signed into law. The Reagan Administration has not pursued the matter. 
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In the future, if any legislative attention is given to the foreign tax 
credit, it should be noted that reducing or eliminating this provision would 
handicap U.S. oil companies relative to their foreign competitors and, thus, 
impede the search for new energy sources. The foreign tax credit has much 
history and precedent behind it. The credit was created in 1918 to protect 
all U.S. taxpayers earning foreign income from being taxed twice on it: once 
by the foreign government and again by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. 
Nearly every industrial nation has a similar procedure for avoiding double 
taxation. Some, like France and the Netherlands, exempt their oil companies' 
foreign income altogether. 
Some Relevant History of Energy Shifts 
There clearly seems to be problems of consistency in relating the 
long-term goal of increasing domestyc energy supplies and the impacts of 
taxation and related regulatory policies. On the basis of the ambitious 
investment schedule quoted earlier, one might have expected a more supportive 
or at least less inhibiting set of policies toward the petroleum companies 
which constitute the central sector of the energy industry. However, a survey 
of past tax policy toward the energy industry does not generate much 
enthusiasm for instituting yet another round of specialized tax treatment. 
It is useful, however, to draw upon earlier and more successful 
experiences in American history, when this nation faced significant shifts in 
energy production and consumption. Those adjustments proceeded quite 
satisfactorily in the past. Successive shifts occurred from one energy source 
to another, as the underlying economics relative prices -- changed. 
For example, in 1800, illumination in America was provided mainly by 
candles and oil lamps, with fuel for the lamps coming from whale oil. Whales 
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did not become extinct as the country grew. As the price of whale oil rose 
from 23 cents a gallon in 1832 to $1.45 in 1865, consumers switched to 
substitutes. In the 1850s, coal oil or kerosene derived from coal 
distillation dominated the residential market for illumination. In turn, its 
success was followed by an equally meteoric decline in favor of a new fuel 
that had appeared in the market, petroleum. By 1863, virtually all coal 
refiners had switched over to crude-oil refining, and many new refineries 
appeared. 
Thus, the shifts from whale oil to kerosene to gasoline resulted not from 
an act of Congress or a subsidy from the Treasury, but from successive 
movements in the price of energy. The implication for our times is clear: 
the sooner that government frees existing energy sources, such as natural gas, 
from artificial price restraints, the sooner will new domestic energy sources 
become commerically competitive. Conversely, the continuation of price 
controls on natural gas delays the time when new domestic sources, including 
solar energy or synthetic fuels, will come into widespread use. The major 
spur to developing domestic energy sources will not be government subsidy, but 
price decontrol of existing energy sources. 8 
These interactions are currently most visible in the area of natural gas. 
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 was designed to raise the wellhead prices 
of natural gas in order to achieve a balance between supply and demand in 
1988. As pointed out above, the legislation specified gradual price increases 
for various categories of gas, based on a projected price of oil that today is 
considerably lower than current oil prices. This price disparity has prompted 
new inefficiencies in the allocation and consumption of natural gas. The 
8weidenbaum, ~cit., pp. 114-120. 
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smooth transition to a deregulated market envisioned by the framers of the Act 
may not occur. 
At the present time, high-priced natural gas is being imported from 
Canada at a time when cheaper U.S. supplies are in surplus. The problems in 
the gas market have been caused by the interaction of inflexible federal price 
control and rigid contracts between pipeline companies and producers. The 
contracts, in turn, were by-products of the long and convoluted history of 
government regulation of energy. 
The basic problem is that federal regulation is too rigid to allow gas 
prices to reflect changing conditions. Natural gas prices are now at levels 
that have encouraged switching back to oil. With an estimated 15 percent of 
capacity idle, it is not clear that a sharp run up in prices would result if 
natural gas were deregulated. 9 The successful decontrol of oil prices two 
years ago provides the appropriate model. 
The Future Role of Energy Tax Policy 
When we examine the prospects for using tax policy to increase the 
likelihood of achieving the nation•s investment targets, we find that there 
are many competing demands for tax reform. There is no shortage of 
alternatives for Congress to choose from: (1) moving to a flat or at least 
flatter income tax structure, (2) shifting the basis of federal taxation from 
income to sales or value added, (3) enhancing the equity of the tax system by 
closing all those 11 loopholes," and (4) increasing revenues in order to reduce 
the extremely large budget deficits that are in prospect for the next several 
9congressional Budget Office, Natural Gas Pricing Policies, Washington, 
Government Printing Office, 1983, p. 1; 11 Natural-Gas Deregulation: Time To 
Act, .. Morgan Guaranty Survey, January 1983, pp. 12-13. 
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years. Thus, any consideration of changes in energy taxation specifically 
must be placed in the larger context of changes in tax policy generally. 
In a private enterprise economy, it is not appropriate that government, 
via tax policies or other mechanisms, guarantee that the energy industry will 
secure a larger total flow of funds in the 1980s. But the policies are needed 
to enable the energy industry to compete for those funds on an equal basis 
with other industries -- with no special subsidies and no special handicaps. 
The key alternative, in contrast, is an approach to industrial policy 
characterized by a series of quick fixes as the various sectors of society 
compete for specific government assistance. An important added benefit would 
accrue from the market-oriented approach proposed here -- a higher level of 
efficiency in the American economy, with a shift from dependence on government 
direction to reliance on competition in the market place. 
The Future Role of Regulatory Policy 
The expansion of environmental and other regulation has created major 
obstacles facing virtually every proposed energy project -- including those 
that are finally approved. Without downplaying the importance of tax 
considerations, perhaps the most serious energy problem in the United States 
today is the long delays that occur during the planning and construction 
phases of new energy projects. The delays do not arise primarily out of 
technology or problems in financing; they are, instead, the result of 
government. 
From the investor•s viewpoint, those problems increase uncertainty --
which can be devastating for major capital projects such as those involved in 
developing new forms of energy. An act of Congress finally was required to 
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override legal a~d ecological barriers so that the Alaskan pipeline could 
proceed. As an example of the governmental obstacles, the following are 14 
major regulatory constraints to be faced in developing a new synthetic fuel 
project, any one of which could bring a project to a halt. 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Preparing an environmental impact statement, as required by the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. 
Meeting new source performance standards for air quality, under 
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. 
Meeting the hazardous pollutant emission standards, under the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. 
Meeting the state air-quality implementation plans required by 
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. 
Obtaining necessary point source discharge permits, under the 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. 
Meeting state water quality standards and water quality manage-
ment plans, as promulgated under the Clean Water Act of 1977 
Complying with limitations applicable to "underground injections," 
under the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974. 
Complying with the regulaton of interstate pipeline transmissions, 
under the Interstate Commerce Act. 
Complying with the prohibition against a carrier transporting its 
own products, under the Interstate Commerce Act. 
Complying with the regulation of interstate transmission of 
synthetic gas once it is mixed with natural gas, under the 
Natural Gas Act of 1978. 
Obtaining necessary plant and mine leases from the U.S. Bureau 
of Land Management. 
Obtaining necessary water allocations from the U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation. 
Complying with the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as 
amended. 10 
10President's Energy Resources Council, Synfuels Interagency Task Force, 
Recommendations for a Synthetic Fuels Commercialization Program, vol. 1, 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), and more recent 
data. 
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The uncertainty for private industry resulting from the way in which 
various environmental programs are carried out can be overwhelming in the case 
of a new energy facility. In many cases, various energy projects and 
power-generating plans nuclear and non-nuclear alike -- have never become 
operational because of the delays. Yet, public concern about pollution of air 
and water and destruction of natural resources continues to be very real. The 
need, thus, is for a careful review of the vast and cumbersome regulatory 
labyrinth and the elimination of regulations that do not pass the economic 
test of generating more benefits than costs.11 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
A realistic and effective government policy for energy development 
requires changes in the federal tax and regulatory systems. These changes 
fall into two categories: (1) eliminating the special benefits that have been 
granted to the various segments of the energy industry, and (2) simultaneously 
removing the many obstacles that have been placed in the industry's path. The 
basic approach suggested here is a new twist to an old saying: "Don't just 
stand there, undo something. The following is a brief outline of the needed 
changes: 
(1) Eliminate the windfall profits tax. That tax does nothing to help 
curtail energy consumption, but it simultaneously reduces the 
financial ability of the private sector to increase domestic energy 
production. 
(2) Eliminate the regulatory functions of the Department of Energy. 
The sooner that domestic energy prices equal world market 
11Murray L. Weidenbaum, The Future of Business Regulation, New York, 
Amacom, 1980. 
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prices, the sooner will new domestic energy sources --
conventional and unconventional, including synthetic fuel, 
solar energy, etc. -- become competitive. Moreover, realistic 
prices will become the most effective stimulus to energy 
conservation. Deregulation of natural gas prices is long 
overdue. 
(3) Eliminate the host of tax breaks for specialized energy projects. 
Tax subsidies would no longer be needed in an environment where 
realistic energy prices prevail. The experience of the home 
insulation industry is instructive. The producers in that 
industry found that their order books became full just as soon as 
the public realized that insulation was a good way of reducing 
high and rising energy costs. The federal subsidies came later. 
(4) Cut back the regulatory obstacles which impede the construction 
and operation of new energy projects. What is truly needed is 
not a special board to cut red tape for a few arbitrarily selected 
energy projects, but comprehensive reform of the entire 
regulatory process. Without these reforms, many of the tax 
incentives for new investment will turn out to be ineffective. 
The inability to obtain the many government permits and approvals 
needed for a new project cannot be overcome by increasing the 
normal after-tax rate of return. At present, the thicket of 
government rules makes every proposed energy project an 
attractive target for any self-appointed advocate of the status 
quo and for opponents of economic growth. 
(5) Cut back the expenditure subsidies for the highly specific energy 
activities that the Congress arbitrarily has chosen to support. 
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These special aids would no longer be necessary if the first four 
proposals are adopted. The elimination of the windfall profits 
tax revenues would make it more urgent to reduce these low-
priority outlays in order to minimize budget deficits. 
Boiled down to its essence, the most effective national policy to promote 
domestic energy development is to achieve a well-functioning market economy 
that does not require special policies for any specific industry -- energy or 
any other. The optimum energy tax policy is to tax the activities of the 
energy industry exactly the same way as any other business is taxed -- without 
prejudice or favoritism. 
